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ABSTRACT

Recent research has demonstrated that good judges - individuals who form accurate
impressions of others - are skilled at detecting and utilizing social cues (Rogers & Biesanz, in
press). Given this ability to detect and use cues, this study sought to determine whether good
judges of personality are also skilled at detecting deception, as individuals are inaccurate in their
judgements of deception (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). A sample of college students (N = 262)
viewed videos of 10 individuals answering getting to know you questions and rated their
personality. They then viewed videos of 14 individuals either lying or telling the truth that they
did not cheat on a math task. Results indicated that participants were accurate in rating the
personality of others and their accuracy of judging lies was significantly higher than chance.
However, personality accuracy was not related to accuracy of judging lies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Social interactions are part of everyday life and are crucial for maintaining relationships
and for meeting new people. During social interactions, especially during initial interactions,
people attempt to understand others better. When people first meet someone, they form a first
impression, which can influence how they view that individual in the future. This has
implications for continuing relationships or applying for jobs. People use a variety of information
to form first impressions, sometimes using unique information provided in their interactions with
others and other times based on general impressions of people on average. Fortunately, people
are generally accurate in judging others’ personalities (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & Human, 2010;
Funder, 1995), but some people tend to view others more accurately- good judges (Funder, 1995;
Letzring, 2008; Rogers & Biesanz, in press), and some people tend to be viewed more
accurately- good targets (Human & Biesanz, 2011, 2013).
Given that good judges of personality exist, it is possible that there is an underlying skill
for forming interpersonal impressions. There are several forms of interpersonal impressions,
including forming impressions of whether an individual is lying. If the skills of a good judge of
personality translate to multiple forms of interpersonal impressions, it is possible that those skills
could lead to accurate judgments of deception. Research on detecting deception has shown that
the average person is generally inaccurate in their judgments of truth and lies (Bond & DePaulo,
2008), with very few predicters being reliable, such as focusing on relevant cues of deception
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(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010), being trained in relevant cues of deception (Ekman &
O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010), and the ability to identify micro-expressions (Frank &
Ekman, 1997). This indicates that research needs to further assess what reliably predicts lying
accuracy. In the current study I examined whether the good judge of personality would also be a
good judge of lying.

Interpersonal Perceptions
Interpersonal perception involves a target- the individual whose personality is being
judged- and a perceiver- the individual who is judging the personality of the target (Funder,
1995). People are generally accurate in judging others’ personalities (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz &
Human, 2010; Funder, 1995). The Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) outlines the process for a
perceiver to make an accurate judgment of a target (Funder, 1995). Both targets and perceivers
are crucial to the process of forming accurate personality impressions. Targets must make
relevant behaviors available to the perceiver (Funder, 1995). For example, for a target to be
accurately viewed as extraverted they would need to exhibit relevant cues to extraversion, such
as being talkative, frequently so that perceivers can detect those cues. Perceivers then have to
detect and accurately utilize this information to form an accurate impression (Funder, 1995). For
example, an accurate perceiver would detect, or observe, relevant cues to extraversion, such as
being talkative, and then utilize those detected cues to rate that target high in extraversion instead
of being high in neuroticism. RAM defines an accurate impression as one that agrees with the
target’s personality traits (Funder, 1995). This agreement can be assessed in different ways,
including comparing the perceiver’s impressions to the target’s self-reports of personality and
reports of their personality from family or friends (Funder, 1995).
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In line with Biesanz (2010) and Furr (2008), it is possible to assess two aspects of
accuracy: distinctive and normative. Distinctive accuracy is when others see the unique
personality traits in an individual and can distinguish them from other individuals (Biesanz,
2010; Rogers, Wood, & Furr, 2018). This includes knowing levels of traits in individuals, such
as whether an individual is more talkative than kind, and how they differ from other targets on
those traits (Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018). Normative accuracy is when perceivers view a
target as similar to the average person, such as knowing how talkative and kind most people are
(Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018). Viewing individuals similarly to the average person’s
personality, or normatively, also means the impressions is positive and socially desirable (e.g.,
most people are more kind than hostile), because the average person’s personality tends to be
positive (Wood & Furr, 2016). Normative accuracy also tends to be a positive because the
normative means are calculated by taking the average of all the targets’ self-report, and most
people tend to self-report in a positive manner (Borkenau & Leising, 2016; Wood, Gosling, &
Potter, 2007).
It is necessary to separate these two aspects of impressions because impressions could
relate strongly with a target’s self-report, but once the normative profile is accounted for their
impressions may not relate strongly with a target’s self-report (Furr, 2008; Rogers et al., 2018).
This would indicate that they were not viewing the target’s unique personality traits but are
seeing them as similar to the average person. A perceiver’s impressions could also not relate with
a target’s self-report, but once the normative profile is accounted for their impressions may relate
strongly with a target’s unique self-report (Furr, 2008; Rogers et al., 2018). This would indicate
that the perceiver was viewing the target in line with their unique traits. When only assessing the
raw personality profile, it is possible that researchers could draw incorrect conclusions because
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most personality profiles tend to be normative (Furr, 2008). By separating personality profiles
into distinctive and normative assessments it provides researchers with more information about
the ways in which perceivers are viewing the targets.

Variability in Interpersonal Perception
While, on average, people are accurate in their impressions of others, there are individual
differences in the tendency to view others accurately and to be viewed accurately by others.
Moreover, a specific dyad may also result in a more or less accurate impression than expected by
either the target or perceiver average tendencies. While it is important to find that people can
view others accurately and be viewed accurately, it is also important to understand how people
vary these abilities to judge and be judged accurately.
Recent research has focused on individual differences in being a good target – an
individual who tends to be understood easily and accurately by others (Human & Biesanz, 2011,
2013; Human, Biesanz, Finseth, Pierce, & Le, 2014; Human, Biesanz, Parisotto, & Dunn, 2012).
In line with RAM (Funder, 1995), targets primarily influence impression accuracy via cue
relevancy and availability, but targets may also be able to obtain greater attention from a
perceiver, thereby increasing detection (Human et al., 2012). Indeed, well-adjusted targets are
seen more accurately because they disclose a higher quality of personality information (Human
& Biesanz, 2011) and tend to behave more in line with their personality (Human et al., 2014).
Moreover, targets who self-present are viewed more accurately by others because they were
engaging and well liked, resulting in perceivers paying closer attention during interactions
(Human et al., 2012).
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Compared to targets, perceivers do not vary widely in how accurately they judge the
personality of others. Females are more normatively accurate than males and have greater
knowledge of the average personality (Chan, Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011; Rogers &
Biesanz, 2015). Research has also indicated that the motivation of the perceiver impacts
accuracy. When perceivers are motivated to judge a target accurately, by being told to be as
accurate as possible, they perceive more detailed information about the target’s personality and
form more distinctive, but less normative impressions (Biesanz & Human, 2010). Finally,
individuals that are good judges are better able to judge personality as they have general
knowledge about personality and human nature, are highly intelligent, have social skills, and
greater similarity to the target (Davis & Kraus, 1997). However, different studies have found
various characteristics associated with being a good judge. Overall, perceivers are more accurate
when they observe unique and detailed information about targets and are able to apply those
observations in order to form accurate personality impressions.

The Distinctive Good Judge
While people are generally accurate in judging personality, the good judge forms more
accurate impressions of others (Funder, 1995; Letzring, 2008; Rogers & Biesanz, in press).
There have been contradictory results regarding the existence of the good judge. Some research
indicates that there is no evidence of good judges (Allik, de Vries, & Realo, 2016) or that they
are not significantly different from average judges of personality (Haselton & Funder, 2006).
However, there are methodological issues that prevent the effect of the good judge from being
evident in some studies. One is that when searching for the good judge, impressions are formed
across good and poor targets. Poor targets do not provide enough cues to their personality
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(Human & Biesanz, 2013), meaning that they provide little to no information about their
personality traits. Without information on a target’s personality, even those skilled in accurately
judging personality cannot form accurate impressions (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). As a result,
it appears that the good judge is no more accurate in forming impressions than the average
person because the individual differences in the good judge are washed out. Conversely, when
studies assess the effects of good targets it makes it possible for the individual differences of the
perceiver to be evident, showing that good judges of personality form more accurate impressions
than a poor judge of personality (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). With more support for the
existence of the good judge, it is important to understand what characteristics result in the ability
of the good judge to form accurate impressions.
Research has documented several potential characteristics of good judges, such as a
greater understanding of human nature, social skills, higher intelligence, and greater similarity to
the target (Davis & Kraus, 1997). These positive characteristics have been found in recent
research to make others feel comfortable providing information about themselves (Letzring,
2008), thereby aiding the process of accurate personality judgments. The characteristics of the
good judge also relate to the process of accurate personality judgments proposed by Funder
(1995) in the RAM model of accuracy. First, it is possible that due to the good judge’s social and
agreeable nature, targets may provide more relevant cues in the interaction because they are
comfortable around the good judge (Letzring, 2008). This makes them better able to obtain
information about targets which improves accuracy. They also detect more of the cues provided
by the target by being attentive and possibly more motivated to accurately judge personality and
then better utilize those cues to form accurate impressions of personality (Rogers & Biesanz, in
press). Research on the ability of the good judge to accurately judge personality raises the
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question of what other skills the good judge may have. Given that they have higher impression
accuracy, would they also have higher lie detection accuracy?

Detecting Deception
Research on detecting deception has found that, on average, individuals are often
inaccurate in their judgments of lying, with lie detection accuracy being no better than chance
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997).
However, some characteristics of targets and perceivers increase the accuracy of detecting
deception, such as individuals who are high in openness and agreeableness (Enos et al., 2006).
Those high in openness may adjust to other viewpoints and rely less on set preconceptions about
relevant deception cues (Enos et al., 2006). Additionally, increased lie detection accuracy is also
the result of focusing on relevant cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010). The
ability to focus on relevant cues can be improved with training (Vrij et al., 2010), which is
supported by research showing that secret service agents accurately detect lies at slightly higher
than chance levels (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991). This could indicate that skill is involved in
detecting lies. Training methods include telling people the cues to focus on and ones to ignore,
educating people on what cues are relevant to lie detection, or providing feedback on whether
their judgments of lies were accurate (Vrij et al., 2010). However, some individuals who are
trained in detecting deception are still only accurate at chance levels, indicating that training is
not the only component of accurately judging deception.
Moreover, the type of lie may relate to an individual’s ability to detect lies. Frank and
Ekman (1997) found that lie detection accuracy in two different high stakes situations, one in
people were lying about a crime and one in which they were lying about their opinion, were
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related. This means that high stakes lies were accurately judged across two different studies,
showing a reliable ability to judge high stakes lies. Frank and Ekman (1997) also found that lie
accuracy was also related to the ability to identify micro-expressions, which are brief facial
expressions demonstrating strong emotions. This demonstrates that micro-expressions may be a
reliable indicator that someone is lying. However, low stakes lies are often not accurately judged
across different types of lies (Frank & Ekman, 1997). In sum, type of lie is associated with
accuracy, such that high stakes lies are often easier to detect than low stakes lies.
Additionally, similar to impression accuracy (Human & Biesanz, 2013), targets vary
more in their ability to lie than perceivers do in their ability to detect lies (Bond & DePaulo,
2008). This indicates that the processes involved in judging personality and deception have
similarities, which could mean that the process of accurately forming impressions of personality
and deception could be related. There also appear to be methodological parallels in personality
and deception research that could contribute to lower accuracy. Lie detection research often does
not directly assess whether people are judging good or bad liars (Culhane, Kehn, Hatz, &
Hildebrand, 2015; DesJardins & Hodges, 2015; Frank & Ekman, 1997), just as first impression
research often assesses the ability to form accurate impressions across good and bad targets. This
could be another reason why lying accuracy has been low in previous research. While a recent
meta-analyses found that accuracy of judging personality and deception were unrelated, this
study still has the same methodological issues of assessing accuracy of perceivers across good
and bad targets (Schlegel, Boone, & Hall, 2017). Some of the interpersonal assessments also had
low reliability and construct validity, as the personality assessments did not correlate strongly
with one another. This indicates that the personality assessments analyzed were not valid or
measured personality accuracy too differently for these measures to correlate. If the personality
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assessments did not correlate strongly with one another it would be unlikely for them to correlate
strongly with an assessment of lying accuracy. Thus, it remains an open question whether an
individual who generally understands the personality of others is also able to detect lies.

Reasons for Inaccurate Judgments of Deception
The impressions that an individual forms of others impacts their ability to accurately
judge lying. If perceivers viewed a target as credible and trustworthy, they were more likely to
think the target was being honest even if the target was lying (Baker, Porter, ten Brinke, &
Mundy, 2016; Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Self-presentation could also influence accuracy of
detecting deception. Individuals that are lying could portray themselves more positively than is
accurate, which elicits positive impressions from perceivers in first impression research (Human
et al., 2012). This could influence perceivers to indicate that someone is telling the truth even if
they are lying. However, in first impression research positive self-presentation can also lead to
greater distinctive accuracy in personality impressions as the engaging nature of the target is
associated with increased attention from the perceiver (Human et al., 2012). This could indicate
that positive self-presentation could make perceivers more attentive to the targets and increase
their accuracy of detecting lies. While the direction of this influence in deception research is
unclear, these findings do indicate that how individuals view others and how individuals present
themselves could influence lie detection accuracy.
Overall, perceivers assume that targets are honest, which is referred to as truth bias (Bond
& DePaulo, 2008). One study found that truth biases were prevalent in face-to-face interactions,
especially when individuals knew one another (Burgoon & Buller, 1994). Another study found
that discovered that perceivers also assumed target honesty due to lack of motivation to
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accurately detect lies, as it is simpler and sometimes beneficial to accept lies (Vrij et al., 2010).
While most perceivers assume honesty, there are some perceivers that consistently assume
targets are lying, referred to as lie biases. Lie biases were present when perceivers were
suspicious in nature (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Burgoon & Buller, 1994). These biases often
overwhelm the average individual’s ability to detect lies.
Lie detection is a challenging task. Verbal and nonverbal cues are crucial in detecting
deception, and research has indicated that participants often attributed deception to irrelevant
cues (DePaulo et al., 1997). Cues are often difficult to detect as targets attempt to appear credible
and hide deceptive cues, especially with high stakes lies, and there are also small differences
between cues that indicate individuals were telling the truth and cues that indicate individuals
were lying (Vrij et al., 2010). As a result, perceivers struggle to accurately utilize cues as there
are no specific and unique cues associated only with lying (Vrij et al., 2010). For example,
perceivers often think that targets will look away and move more frequently when they are lying,
when the opposite is true (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996). Lie detection accuracy also
decreases when perceivers focus too much on nonverbal cues without considering relevant verbal
cues (Vrij et al., 2010). When perceivers relied on irrelevant cues and were confident in their
judgments of lying and in their own skill of detecting deception, lie detection accuracy decreased
(DePaulo et al., 1997; Vrij et al., 2010). Thus, it is important to focus on relevant cues to
deception in order to accurately detect deception.

Relevant Cues to Deception
Perceivers often attribute deception to inaccurate cues, demonstrating the importance of
knowing accurate deception cues, which consist of both verbal and nonverbal cues. However,
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both verbal and nonverbal cues are often idiosyncratic. Verbal cues to deception can include
speech, such as errors in speech, fillers such as “um” or “ah”, long pauses before responding,
talking slower, and tone and pitch of voice (DePaulo et al., 2003; Levitan et al., 2015; Vrij et al.,
2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996). DePaulo et al. (2003) found that the content of speech is also
important, with truthful stories containing more detail and sensory information than lies in some
cases (DePaulo et al., 2003). Those that are lying may also be more negative in their comments,
complaining often (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, these cues vary between targets and are not
always reliable indicators of whether an individual is lying.
Nonverbal cues to deception can include less body movement and emotional cues present
in facial expression (DePaulo et al., 2003; Frank & Ekman, 1997; Vrij & Semin, 1996).
Emotional cues are often present in high stakes lies, where emotions are expressed on the target’s
face as micro-expressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997; Yan, Wang, Liu, Wu, & Fu, 2014). Microexpressions only briefly show emotion, so training is often necessary to be able to detect these
expressions (Yan et al., 2014). These facial expressions may be less pleasant than someone
telling the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003). Research has demonstrated the importance of both verbal
and nonverbal cues in lie detection accuracy as well as the importance of considering both when
determining whether a target is lying (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010). There are
few reliable cues to deception, which contributes to the difficulty of the task of detecting
deception.
With research suggesting that individuals, on average, cannot accurately detect deception
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 1997) it leaves open for the possibility of important
individual differences. That is, while on average, people may be no better than chance, there may
still be important variability across individuals. As such, it is possible that the good judge of
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personality may be one person who is also able to better detect lying. The ability of a good judge
to detect and utilize relevant cues should help them overcome the reasons for inaccurate
judgments of deception. Their skills in forming impressions of personality could translate to the
task of detecting deception, which would make a good judge of personality more accurate in
detecting lies.

Other Types of Accuracy
As lie detection involves forming impressions of the value of honesty, it is important to
know whether individuals can accurately judge values. In addition to the judgments of
personality traits, research has examined the accuracy of judging values - the motivation and
reasoning behind an individual’s decision to behave in a certain way (McDonald & Letzring,
2016). Research indicates that perceivers more accurately judged traits than values (McDonald &
Letzring, 2016). While some values, such as tradition, were judged accurately, overall
perceivers’ ratings of traits were more accurate (McDonald & Letzring, 2016). However, when
separating normative and distinctive accuracy, there was no significant difference in accuracy of
personality and value judgments (McDonald & Letzring, 2016). This could indicate that the
ability to judge personality is related to judging values like honesty when assessing the two
components of accuracy. As good judges are more distinctively accurate, a good judge of
personality could also be a good judge of values, such as honesty, and therefore more accurate in
detecting deception.
As demonstrated in studies with high stakes lies, emotional cues are important in lie
detection accuracy. Empathy of the perceiver is crucial to accurately judging affect, however this
is only the case if the target clearly expresses their emotions (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008),
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just as having a good target influences accuracy of personality impressions. Research indicates
that individuals are equally accurate in judging affect and personality (Hall, Gunnery, Letzring,
Carney, & Colvin, 2016). There was a relationship between judging personality and affect when
the affect and personality trait were related; for example, accurately judging negative affect was
related to accurately judging neuroticism (Hall et al., 2016). This indicates that similar processes
are used to judge affect and personality. Therefore, a good judge of personality may be a good
judge of affect. This could mean that good judges may be better able to detect the emotional cues
present when targets lie which should increase accuracy.

The Good Judge’s Ability to Detect Deception
The characteristics of good judges may increase their lie detection accuracy by helping
them avoid hindrances to lie detection accuracy and increasing their ability to detect relevant
deception cues. Research has indicated that individuals do not accurately detect deception (Bond
& DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 1997) as a result of inaccurate personality judgments (Bond &
DePaulo, 2008), biases (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Burgoon & Buller, 1994), difficulties present in
detecting lies (Vrij et al., 2010), and focusing on irrelevant cues (DePaulo et al., 1997; Vrij et al.,
2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996). The ability of a good judge to detect and utilize relevant cues should
help them overcome the reasons for inaccurate judgments of deception.
The truth bias present in deception research (Bond & DePaulo, 2008) could be the result
of normative accuracy. Perceivers may not have received enough information to distinguish the
targets from the average person. Since the average personality profile is positive (Biesanz, 2010;
Rogers & Biesanz, 2015; Wood et al., 2007), lie detection accuracy could decrease by viewing a
lying individual as an average person. Given that good judges are distinctively accurate, their
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ability to detect more cues and unique information about the target could decrease the biases
present in deception research due to inaccurate personality judgments, thereby increasing
accuracy (Funder, 1995; Letzring, 2008).
The good judge’s ability to detect and utilize cues (Rogers & Biesanz, in press) may help
them overcome the difficulties of unclear cues due to attempts to appear credible, minor
differences in behavior of those telling the truth and lying, and the lack of a single defining cue
of deception. They should be able to detect relevant cues of deception more often than the
average person and utilize those cues more appropriately instead of focusing on and drawing
conclusions from irrelevant cues.
Research has also shown that personality traits (Enos et al., 2006), occupation (Ekman &
O'Sullivan, 1991), training and skill (Vrij et al., 2010), and focusing on relevant deception cues
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010) can improve lie detection accuracy. Research on the
influence of occupation and training on lie detection accuracy indicate that skill is involved in
detecting lies. With the good judge’s skill in impression accuracy, it is possible that skill will
improve the lie detection accuracy. Finally, good judges are better able to detect and utilize cues,
so they should focus on relevant verbal and nonverbal cues and utilize both forms of cues.

Hypotheses
Given that good judges can accurately judge personality, it is possible they have other
abilities such as lie detection. Are good judges more accurate in their judgments of everyday lies
and high stakes lies? I hypothesized that good judges would more accurately detect high stakes
and everyday lies than a poor judge. I also predicted that there would be a stronger effect for
high stakes lies as these provide more cues, such as micro-expressions. Normative judges, those
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who tend to rate someone as similar to the average person, I predicted would display an honesty
bias because of their positive impressions. Given that confidence in irrelevant deception cues
decreases lie detection accuracy, I predicted that good judges, who focus on relevant cues, who
are confident in their ratings of personality and lie detection would have higher levels of lie
detection accuracy. Alternatively, poor judges, who focus on irrelevant cues, who are confident
in their ratings would have lower levels of lie detection accuracy. Good judges of honesty and
agreeableness would also differ in lie detection accuracy due to their ability to understand how
honest and agreeable people are on average. If perceivers can accurately judge a target’s general
tendency to be honest, they would be able to judge whether an individual is lying in a given
scenario. Similarly, if perceivers can accurately judge a target’s general tendency to be sincere
and non-manipulative, characteristic of those high in agreeableness, they would be able to judge
whether an individual is being sincere and honest in their statements.
Personality traits of the perceivers would also predict lying accuracy. Specifically, those
high in openness and agreeableness would be more accurate in judging lies. Those that value
honesty would also more accurately detect lies. Finally, I predicted an interaction between
perceived credibility or trustworthiness of target and the accuracy of lie detection. If targets are
honest and are perceived to be trustworthy then lie detection accuracy would increase. However,
if the target is not honest but is perceived to trustworthy then lie detection accuracy would
decrease.
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CHAPTER II
PILOT STUDY METHODOLOGY

Overview
The purpose of the pilot study was to determine which interview videos to use as stimuli
for participants to rate the personality of targets in the thesis study. Participants viewed 10 or 11
different individuals answering the same basic getting to know you questions before rating the
personality of those individuals. After each video, they rated the personality of the target. This
study, called Analyzing Personality, was approved by the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga’s (UTC) Institutional Review Board with the approval code of 16-057 and lasted
for one hour.

Participants
A total of 310 (271 female) UTC students between the ages of 18 and 62 years (M =
20.95, SD = 4.96) participated in the study. They were recruited through the psychology
department’s human subject pool (n = 133), the SONA system, in which they participated in
groups of 1 to 9 (Mdn = 5), as well as through research methods and statistics laboratory courses
(n = 177) in which they participated in groups of 9 to 27 (Mdn = 13). Two participants were
excluded due to tablet malfunctions during the study and specific impressions were excluded if
participants knew a specific target (n = 86, 3% of impressions). This ensures that all judgments
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are coming from first impressions of the targets’ personality. As a result, perceivers formed 6 to
11 impressions after excluding data (Mdn = 8). Finally, 6 perceivers only rated 8 out of the 10
videos due to a fire alarm. Participants received course extra credit for participating.

Materials
The videos used in this study were created in a previous research project at UTC in which
one of two researchers interviewed participants with basic getting to know you questions. A total
of 92 targets were taped answering questions regarding major life decisions (Andersen & Ross,
1984; Human et al., 2014), passions (Human et al., 2014), greatest accomplishments, and other
questions that were not of interest to this study. To create the sets of videos for this study, target
videos were excluded if the target did not consent to showing the video (n = 2), did not receive
any peer or parent reports (n = 34), or the peer and parent reports did not vary in their responses
(n = 2), if the target did not complete the self-report of their personality (n = 1), or the target did
not respond to all of the chosen interview questions (n = 2). Self, peer and parent reports of the
target’s personality are necessary for my analytical method to create a composite of personality
traits for each target using the average of these personality reports, so the video targets
nominated peers and a parent or guardian to report on the target’s personality. The perceivers’
judgments were then compared to these composites to determine which targets were more
accurately judged by others. These exclusion criteria left 51 (48 female) videos that were divided
into 5 video sets of 10 to 11 people that were counterbalanced to offset order effects and fatigue,
resulting in a total of 10 video sets. Ages were between 18 and 49 (M = 22.3, SD = 6.10) and the
video lengths were between 1 min and 2 s and 7 min and 55 s (M = 2 min 24 s, SD = 0.05).

17

Personality Measure
The video targets completed the 40 item mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) which
assesses the big five personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
emotional stability, and openness (see Appendix A). Responses were on a scale of 1 (disagree
strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). All ratings of personality (informants, impressions) completed
this scale to rate the personality of the video targets.

Procedure
For those that participated through the SONA system, 1 of the 10 video sets were
randomly chosen for each session before the study and the questionnaires were opened on tablets
using Qualtrics. Participants first reviewed the consent form and after consenting they provided
their age and gender. Participants then viewed the randomly chosen video set of 10 or 11
different individuals answering basic getting to know you questions. After each interview the
video was paused for participants to complete the mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) to rate the
personality of that individual. After all the videos had been viewed and participants finished
rating the personality of all the individuals in the video, participants were debriefed, and the
study ended. The same procedure was followed for those that participated in research methods
and statistics laboratory courses, except the Qualtrics survey was emailed to all the students in
the course and they opened the questionnaires on the laboratory computers.

Data Analytic Procedure
I used the social accuracy model (SAM) to analyze how accurately the targets were
viewed (Biesanz, 2010). I first calculated the mean by item of male and female participants’
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responses to the self-report personality measure, creating the normative profile. Then I created
the distinctive accuracy component by averaging the target’s personality self-report with their
informant reports for each item (Biesanz, 2010) and subtracted the normative means from the
self and informant means for each item. I obtained this information from the personality selfreports and peer and parent reports from the forming impressions study conducted at UTC. The
target validity measure and average self-reported personality were used simultaneously as
predictors of the perceiver’s impression (Biesanz, 2010).
I analyzed Equation 1 to estimate overall normative and distinctive accuracy:
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘 = β0𝑖𝑗 + β1𝑖𝑗 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘 + β2𝑖𝑗 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑘 ,
where Ratingijk is perceiver i’s rating of target j on item k, 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘 is target j’s averaged selfand informant- report on item k, and ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦k is the average response for the sample on item k.
The slopes in Equation 1 were estimated for each dyad:
β1ij assesses the distinctive accuracy of perceiver i for target j. This estimates how
accurately targets were viewed in line with their unique traits, distinguishing them from
the average person. Distinctive accuracy assesses the extent that perceivers accurately
judged the unique traits of the targets.

β2ij assesses the normative accuracy of perceiver i’s rating of target j. This estimates the
extent to which perceivers viewed the targets as similar to the average person. Normative
accuracy assesses the extent that perceivers judge the targets as similar to the average
person and views them positively.
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These estimates were further broken down into main effects for perceivers, targets, and dyads, as
demonstrated in Equation 2:
β0𝑖𝑗 = β00 + u0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢0(𝑖𝑗) ,
β1𝑖𝑗 = β10 + u1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢1(𝑖𝑗) , and
β2𝑖𝑗 = β20 + u2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑗 + 𝑢2(𝑖𝑗) ,
where β0ij estimates the intercept for perceiver i for target j, β1ij estimates the distinctive accuracy
of perceiver i for target j, and β2ij estimates the normative accuracy of perceiver i for target j.
These estimates indicate how distinctively and normatively accurate perceivers were in judging
the targets and how distinctively and normatively accurate targets were viewed. The purpose of
this study was to find targets that were viewed more distinctively accurately than others,
indicating that they are a good target that provides relevant cues to their personality. As a result,
I focused on the target random effects for distinctive accuracy.
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CHAPTER III
PILOT STUDY RESULTS

Overall Impression Accuracy
First, I assessed the general accuracy of the perceivers’ personality impressions of the
video targets. Overall, perceivers were distinctively accurate, meaning their impressions of the
target were related to the targets’ self-report of personality (Table 1). Perceivers were also
normatively accurate, meaning that perceivers viewed the targets as similar to the average person
and positively (Table 1). I also assessed the individual differences in how distinctively and
normatively accurately the targets were viewed, allowing me to determine whether the targets
varied in how accurately they were viewed. Targets did vary significantly in how distinctively
and normatively accurately they were viewed, indicating that some targets were viewed more
accurately than others (Table 1). This provided evidence for good targets; those individuals were
the ones I chose for my thesis stimuli. I also created a density plot to provide a visual
representation of the variability of the normative and distinctive accuracy assessments. The
density plot for target distinctive accuracy shows the variability between targets in their ability to
be judged distinctively accurate (Figure 1). The density plot for target normative accuracy shows
the variability between targets in their ability to be judged normatively accurate (Figure 2).
These density plots highlight the variability in how accurately the targets were viewed.
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Table 1 Pilot Study Personality Impression Accuracy
Parameter
Fixed Effects
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Random Effects
Perceiver
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Target
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Residual SD
Sample Sizes
Perceivers
Targets
Note. ***p < .001

Estimates (SE)
3.84 (0.02)***
0.12 (0.02)***
0.75 (0.04)***

0.29***
0.05***
0.35***
0.11***
0.14***
0.25***
1.32
287
51

Figure 1 Density plot for target distinctive accuracy
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Figure 2 Density plot for target normative accuracy

Chosen Video Stimuli
To choose the video stimuli for my thesis study, I narrowed the videos down to the 10
targets that obtained the highest estimates for the distinctive accuracy assessment. One of those
videos lasted for 7 min 55 s, which was much higher than the other video lengths that were
between 1 min and 8 s and 2 min and 57 s (M = 2 min 11 s, SD = 3.22 s). I chose to exclude that
target because they were an outlier, possibly providing more cues than the other targets or
causing participants to lose focus while viewing the video. Instead, I chose the target that was
rated the 11th most distinctively accurate. The accuracy estimates were between 0.14 and 0.40 (M
= 0.26, SD = 0.11). Figure 3 plots the normative and distinctive accuracy of all video targets. The
targets that were chosen for the main study are indicated by the markers that are filled in.
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Figure 3 Scatterplot of normative vs. distinctive target assessments
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CHAPTER IV
THESIS STUDY METHODOLOGY

Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine whether those who understand the personality
of others are also able to determine whether an individual is lying. Participants completed selfreports of personality, valuing honesty, and demographics. Participants then viewed videos of
targets answering basic getting to know you questions and rated the targets’ personality. They
then viewed videos of targets telling low and high stakes true or false statements and determined
which statements were true and which were lies. This study, called Accuracy of Impressions,
was approved by the UTC Institutional Review Board with the approval code of 17-181 and
lasted for two hours.

Participants
A total of 262 (218 female) UTC students participated in the study, ages were between 18
and 63 (M = 21.89, SD = 5.23). They were recruited using the SONA system (n = 74) as well as
various undergraduate courses (n = 188). For those that participated through the SONA system,
students participated in groups of 1 to 7 (Mdn = 4). For those that participated in undergraduate
courses, students participated in groups of 30 to 97 (Mdn = 61). Specific impressions were
excluded if the perceiver did not vary their responses (n = 9, 0.4%) or if they knew the target (n
= 234, 10%). This ensures that all judgments are coming from first impressions of the target’s
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personality. As a result, perceivers formed 1 to 10 personality impressions after excluding data
(Mdn = 6). Participants received course extra credit and were entered in a drawing for 1 of 10 25dollar gift cards for participating.

Materials
Personality Videos
I created the personality videos by choosing the 10 targets (9 female) that were rated the
most distinctively accurate from the pilot study. Ages were between 18 and 22 (M = 19.8, SD =
1.62) and the video lengths were between 1 min and 8 s and 2 min and 57 s (M = 2 min 13 s, SD
= 1.48 s). The order of these videos was counterbalanced to ensure effects were not due to the
order of the videos or fatigue.

Lying Videos
The 14 lie videos (14 male) were obtained from Hatz (2007) and Culhane et al. (2015). In
this study participants were instructed to work through math problems that would be used to
place incoming freshman. They were told to work with the other participant, a confederate, to
complete some of the problems and to work on the others alone. With half of the participants the
confederate asked for help on the problems they were supposed to complete alone and with the
other half they did not ask for help. Those that the confederate asked for help did help and those
that the confederate did not ask worked alone. The experimenter then graded the problems and
told all participants that it appeared they had cheated, and they would be punished if they had
cheated. Those in the low stakes condition (n = 6) were told they would not receive extra credit if
they had cheated and those in the high stakes condition (n = 8) were told they would appear
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before an honor board if they had cheated. Participants were questioned and videotaped and
those that did cheat lied in their responses (n = 6) and those that did not cheat were honest in
their responses (n = 8). This created high stakes lies (n = 4) and honest videos (n = 4), as well as
low stakes lies (n = 2) and low stakes honesty videos (n = 4). Ages ranged from 18 to 22 and the
video lengths ranged from 30 s to 2 min 53 s (M= 59 s, SD = 1.50 s). These videos were
compiled by randomly ordering the low and high stakes lies to create one video sequence and
was counterbalanced to create another video sequence to ensure effects were not due to video
order or fatigue.

Measures
Personality
Participants completed the mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) to report their own
personality, which assesses the big five personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness. It contains 40 items with eight items for
each personality trait and responses are on a scale of 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly).
For this study, an additional eight items were included to assess honesty-humility (see Appendix
A). Descriptive statistics for this measure are reported in Table 2. This scale was also used to rate
the personality of the video targets, with an additional item to indicate whether they knew the
video target (see Appendix B). This was used as an exclusion criterion to only assess first
impressions of personality. Participants also completed a basic demographics questionnaire (see
Appendix C).
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Self-Report Measures
Self-Report Measure
Saucier’s Mini-Markers
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Openness
Conscientiousness
Emotional Stability
Honesty-Humility
Valuing Honesty

Mean

SD

4.52
5.74
5.41
5.42
4.38
5.63
5.77

1.10
0.78
0.86
0.90
0.97
0.68
0.45

Reliability (α)
0.80
0.83
0.82
0.80
0.83
0.77
0.70
0.67

Honesty
Participants completed a self-report measure to rate how much they value honesty using
the honesty subscale of the Values in Action Character Survey (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), a
nine item measure of honesty (see Appendix D). Responses are on a scale of 1 (disagree
strongly) to 7 (agree strongly) and descriptive statistics for this scale are provided in Table 2.
After watching the lie videos, perceivers completed a truth or lie measure, in which they
indicated whether they thought the targets were lying or telling the truth and rated their
confidence in their judgments of the targets’ honesty and whether they trusted the target (see
Appendix E).

Procedure
One of the two video orders for the personality and lie videos were randomly chosen for
each session before the study. The questionnaires were completed via Qualtrics. Participants
reviewed the consent form and after consenting they completed the personality and honesty selfreport, as well as demographics measures. They then viewed the videos of 10 individuals
answering questions about their major life decisions, passions, and greatest accomplishments.
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After each video, participants rated the personality of the individual in the video. After viewing
all the personality videos and rating the personality of all the individuals in the videos,
participants viewed the 14 low and high stakes truth or lie videos and after each video completed
the truth or lie measure. After participants watched all the lie videos and completed the truth or
lie measure for each target, they were debriefed, and the study ended. For those that completed
the study in a Social Psychology course (n = 97) and a Psychology and Law course (n = 61),
questionnaires were completed on paper instead of Qualtrics. Finally, those that completed the
study in a Sensation and Perception undergraduate course (n = 30) also completed the
questionnaires on paper and watched the lying videos first and rated whether they thought the
targets were lying or telling the truth and then watched the personality videos and rated the
personality of the targets.

Data Analytic Procedure
Using the Social Accuracy Model (Biesanz, 2010) allowed me to assess individual
differences in perceptive distinctive and normative accuracy. I analyzed Equation 1 to assess
overall impression accuracy across all the personality traits, except I focused on the perceiver
random effects to assess the individual differences between perceivers instead of targets. For this
study I was interested in how accurate perceivers were in judging personality. The equations for
the level two characteristics were:
β0ij = β00 + β01 + u0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢0(𝑖𝑗) ,
β1ij = β10 + β11 + u1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢1(𝑖𝑗) , and
β2ij = β20 + β21 + u2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑗 + 𝑢2(𝑖𝑗) ,
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where β0ij estimates the intercept for perceiver i for target j, β1ij estimates the distinctive
accuracy of perceiver i for target j, and β2ij estimates the normative accuracy of perceiver i for
target j. To test my hypotheses, I included the variables of interest as a moderator to the level two
equations. For example, to assess the accuracy of lie judgments I used Equation 2:
β0𝑖𝑗 = β00 + β01 LyingAccuracy𝑖 + u0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢0(𝑖𝑗) ,
β1𝑖𝑗 = β10 + β11 LyingAccuracy𝑖 + u1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢1(𝑖𝑗) , and
β2𝑖𝑗 = β20 + β21 LyingAccuracy𝑖 + u2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑗 + 𝑢2(𝑖𝑗) ,
where lying accuracy, the total number of correct truth and lie judgments, was added as a
moderator of the distinctive and normative accuracy slopes to determine whether good
distinctive and normative judges of personality are also more accurate in their judgments of
lying. I followed the same procedure for all the moderator variables being assessed in my
hypotheses. However, when assessing the effects of good judges of specific traits, I only
included the items that assessed that trait and assessed the accuracy of those judgments. For
example, when assessing the good judge of honesty-humility I only included the perceivers’
ratings of the honesty-humility items and then used equation 1 to assess distinctive and
normative accuracy.
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CHAPTER V
THESIS STUDY RESULTS

General Impression Accuracy
Personality Impression Accuracy
First, I assessed the general accuracy of the perceivers’ personality impressions using
Equation 1. Then I tested whether there were significant individual differences in the ability to
accurately judge personality and the ability to be accurately judged using a chi square test.
Overall, perceivers were distinctively accurate, meaning their impressions of the target were
related to the target’s self-report. This indicates that perceivers had an accurate understanding of
the unique traits of the personality video targets (Table 3). Perceivers were also normatively
accurate, meaning they viewed targets, on average, as similar to the average person and
positively (Table 3).
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Table 3 Personality Impression Accuracy
Parameter
Fixed Effects
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Random Effects
Perceiver
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Target
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Dyad
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Residual SD
Sample Sizes
Perceivers
Targets
Dyads
Note. ***p < .001

Estimates (SE)
3.77 (0.05)***
0.29 (0.04)***
0.81 (0.07)***

0.27***
0.09***
0.35***
0.15***
0.13***
0.21***
0.05***
0.14***
0.28***
1.24
257
10
2014

Moreover, there were significant individual differences between the accuracy of
perceivers and how accurately targets were viewed. There were significant individual differences
in how distinctively accurate perceivers were (Table 3, Random Effects), meaning that some
perceivers were, on average, more accurate than others. This provides evidence of the good
judge of personality, as good judges of personality are individuals who more accurately judge
personality. There were significant individual differences in how normatively accurate perceivers
were (Table 3, Random Effects), indicating that perceivers differed in how positively they
viewed others. I created density plots to provide a visual representation of the variability of the
normative and distinctive accuracy assessments. The density plot for perceiver distinctive
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accuracy shows the variability between perceivers in their ability to judge others distinctively
accurately (Figure 4). The density plot for perceiver normative accuracy shows the variability
between perceivers in their ability to judge others normatively accurately (Figure 5). These
density plots show variability in how accurately the perceivers were in their personality
judgments, further supporting that there were individual differences between perceivers in how
accurate their judgments were. While the variability is narrow, there are still individual
differences in perceivers’ ability to distinctively accurately judge others.

Figure 4 Density plot of the distinctive good judge
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Figure 5 Density plot of the normative good judge

Finally, there were also significant individual differences in how accurately targets were
viewed, for both distinctive and normative accuracy (Table 3, Random Effects), indicating that
targets differed in how accurately they were viewed. This provides evidence of the good target of
personality, as good targets are individuals whose personality is judged more accurately. Finally,
there were significant differences between dyads on distinctive and normative accuracy above
and beyond those accounted for by the perceiver and target effects (Table 3, Random Effects).

Lying Impression Accuracy
To assess overall lying accuracy, I first added up the total number of accurate lie
judgments for each perceiver to create a total lying accuracy variable. The total number of
accurate judgments ranged from 0 to 13 out of a possible 14 videos (M = 7.73, Mdn = 8, SD =
1.89), with 55% of perceived lie judgments being accurate (Table 3). That is, 55% of the time,
perceivers accurately judged whether targets were lying or telling the truth. Figure 6 shows the
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frequency of total accurate truth and lie judgments, with a dashed line where accuracy equaled 7
indicating chance levels of accuracy. The dashed line where accuracy equals 8 shows the median
accuracy score. I ran a one-sample t test to assess whether lying accuracy was significantly
different than chance levels of getting 50% correct (7 correct judgments) and results indicate that
this level of accuracy is significantly higher than chance levels, t(256) = 6.24, p < .001. This
indicates that, on average, participants were slightly above chance levels for detecting lying.

Figure 6 Histogram of total lie accuracy

Table 4 reports the number of times participants correctly rated targets as honest or lying,
as well as the number of times participants incorrectly rated targets as honest or lying. These
numbers are then broken down for low and high stakes lies as well as the four different groups.
Table 4 also reports the percentages of correct and incorrect impressions of honesty and lying.
These percentages were created by dividing the number of correct impressions (e.g. targets were
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perceived as honest when they were honest or perceived as lying when they were lying) and
incorrect impressions (e.g., targets were perceived as honest when they were lying or perceived
as lying when they were honest) by the total number of impressions formed.
When looking at the frequency of perceived honest and lie judgments for overall lying
accuracy, low stakes lies, SONA participants, psychology and law participants, and sensation
and perception participants, participants tended to be accurate more often in their judgments of
honesty and inaccurate more often in their perceptions of lying (Table 4). This means that
perceivers may have been more likely to rate someone as being honest when the target was
honest and more likely to rate someone as honest even when they were lying. When judging high
stakes lies, participants tended to be accurate more often in their judgments of lying and
inaccurate more often in their judgments of honesty (Table 4, High Stakes Lying Accuracy). This
means that perceivers may have been more likely to rate someone as lying when they were lying
and more likely to rate someone as lying even when targets were honest when judging high
stakes lies. For those that completed the study in the social psychology course, participants
tended to be equally accurate in rating lies and honest statements and tended to be inaccurate
more often in their perceptions of lying (Table 4, Social Psychology Lying Accuracy). This
means that perceivers may have been equally accurate when rating honest and lie statements and
more likely to rate targets as lying when they were honest. However, these percentages are
difficult to interpret as there were more honest videos. This makes it important to conduct further
analyses to determine lying accuracy.
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Table 4 Lying Accuracy Frequency
Target Honest (%) Target Lying (%)
Total Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
1065 (29%)
598 (16%)
Perceived Lying
1026 (28%)
967 (26%)
By type of lie
High Stakes Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
589 (28%)
360 (17%)
Perceived Lying
459 (22%)
684 (33%)
Low Stakes Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
476 (30%)
238 (15%)
Perceived Lying
567 (36%)
283 (18%)
By group
SONA Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
324 (31%)
175 (17%)
Perceived Lying
268 (26%)
269 (26%)
Psychology and Law Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
228 (27%)
156 (18%)
Perceived Lying
260 (31%)
208 (24%)
Social Psychology Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
388 (29%)
185 (14%)
Perceived Lying
375 (28%)
386 (29%)
Sensation and Perception Lying Accuracy
Perceived Honest
125 (29%)
82 (19%)
Perceived Lying
123 (28%)
104 (24%)
Note. These percentages are out of the total number of impressions formed for each section of
the table.

Given that a subset of participants completed the lying assessment first, I assessed
whether there were differences in lying accuracy between participants that completed the lying
assessment first versus those that completed the lying assessment last to determine whether order
effects influenced the results. Across the four groups (three different classes and SONA), the
average accuracy scores ranged from 7.15 to 8.01, with participants that completed the study
through SONA being the most accurate in detecting deception and participants that completed
the study through a psychology and law course being the least accurate (Table 5). To determine
whether these differences were significant, I ran a univariate analysis of variance using simple
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contrast coding to compare the groups that completed the lying assessment last to the group that
completed it first. There were significant group differences, F(3) = 3.71, p = 0.01, however those
differences were between those from the psychology and law course versus the social
psychology and SONA participants, not between the groups that completing the lying assessment
first versus last (Table 5).

Table 5 Lying Accuracy by Group
Variable
n
Mean
SD
Contrast Estimate
SONA
74
8.01
1.64
0.68
Psychology and Law
61
7.15
1.76
-0.19
Social Psychology
97
7.98
2.11
0.69
Sensation and Perception
30
7.39
1.75
Note. Sensation and Perception course served as a reference group

SE
0.42
0.32
0.29

Good Judges and Lying Accuracy
Are Good Distinctive Judges More Accurate in Detecting Lies?
I first hypothesized that good distinctive judges, those that view targets in line with the
target’s unique personality traits, would detect lies more accurately than a poor judge. To analyze
my first hypothesis, I assessed the total lying accuracy as a moderator to Equation 1. This
allowed me to examine whether lying accuracy moderated the relationship between perceiver
ratings and the target’s personality. Results indicated that lying accuracy did not moderate the
relationship between perceivers’ ratings of targets’ personality and the distinctive accuracy
assessment (Table 6), meaning that distinctive good judges did not more accurately detect lies. I
followed the same procedure to assess whether normative good judges were more accurate in
detecting lies and found that lying accuracy did not moderate the relationship between
perceivers’ ratings of targets’ personality and the normative accuracy assessment (Table 6),
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meaning that normative good judges did not more accurately detect lies. These results show that
individuals who were more accurate at judging lies were not more accurate in forming
personality impressions.

Table 6 Personality Accuracy Moderated by Perceptions of Lying
Variable
Lying accuracy
Overall
Distinctive
Normative
High stakes only
Distinctive
Normative
Honesty Bias
Overall
Normative (total honest ratings)
Normative (total incorrect honest ratings)
High Stakes only
Normative (total honest ratings)
Normative (total incorrect honest ratings)
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01

Estimate

SE

0.003
-0.01

0.004
0.01

0.00
-0.02

0.01
0.02

0.02*
0.05**

0.01
0.02

0.05**
0.05**

0.02
0.02

I also predicted that the ability of a good distinctive judge to detect deception would be
stronger with high stakes lies. To assess this, I only included judgments for high stakes lies and
added that as a moderator to Equation 1. However, high stakes lies did not moderate the
relationship between perceivers’ ratings of personality and the distinctive accuracy assessment
(Table 6). I followed the same procedure to assess whether individuals who were more accurate
in lie detection tended to view others normatively and found that accuracy of rating high stakes
lies did not moderate the relationship between perceivers’ ratings of personality and the
normative accuracy assessment (Table 6). This means that individuals who were more accurate
in judging high stakes lies were not more accurate in forming personality impressions.
39

Do Normative Good Judges Display an Honesty Bias?
I hypothesized that normative judges would tend to rate others as being honest, since they
tend to view others positively. To assess whether normative judges displayed an honesty bias, I
only included the times that perceivers rated targets as being honest and added that as a
moderator to Equation 1. Those honest judgments consisted of correct and incorrect honest
judgments. I used this procedure because previous studies that assessed honesty bias looked at
the total number of honest judgments, both accurate and inaccurate (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).
Results indicated that individuals who formed more honest judgments were more likely to view
others normatively accurately and positively (Table 6). Next, I created a variable in which I only
included the times that perceivers inaccurately rated targets as being honest.
I followed this procedure because it better represents an honesty bias; if perceivers rate a
target as honest when they were honest, that does not display bias but an accurate impression of
honesty. I added the total number of incorrect honest judgments as a moderator to Equation 1
and found that individuals who formed more incorrect honest judgments were more likely to
view others normatively and positively (Table 6). These results replicate when examining only
high stakes lies (Table 6). Together, these results support the idea that individuals who tend to
view others as honest, also tend to view others as similar to the average person and positively.

Are Good Judges of Specific Traits More Accurate in Detecting Lies?
I also hypothesized that good judges of the specific traits would more accurately detect
lies. To determine who is able to accurately assess honesty-humility in others, I used SAM (see
Equation 1), but only included the eight items that assessed honesty-humility. Then, paralleling
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previous approaches, I included perceiver’s lie detection accuracy as a moderator in the equation.
Individuals who were more accurate in detecting lies were not more distinctively or normatively
accurate in rating the honesty-humility of others (Table 7).
Next, I assessed the influence of good judges of agreeableness by including only the
impression items that rated the trait of agreeableness, then included lying accuracy as a
moderator to Equation 1. Results indicated that being a good distinctive or normative judge of
agreeableness were not more accurate at detecting deception (Table 7).
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Table 7 Good Judge of Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness and Lying Accuracy
Parameters
Fixed Effects
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Lying Accuracy
Distinctive*Lying Accuracy
Normative*Lying Accuracy
Random Effects
Perceiver
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Target
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Dyad
Intercept
Distinctive Accuracy
Normative Accuracy
Residual SD
Note. ***p < .001

Honesty-Humility
Estimates (SE)

Agreeableness
Estimates (SE)

4.05 (0.05)***
0.17 (0.07)***
0.71 (0.06)***
-0.0003 (0.004)
-0.0001 (0.003)
-0.00001 (0.002)

3.70 (0.06)***
0.26 (0.08)***
0.91 (0.06)***
-0.000004 (0.003)
-0.0001 (0.004)
-0.00001 (0.002)

0.24***
0.18***
0.35***

0.28***
0.18***
0.29***

0.16***
0.21***
0.18***

0.17***
0.25***
0.16***

0.37***
0.51***
0.40***
0.82

0.34***
0.61***
0.36***
0.76

Perceiver Traits and Lying Accuracy
Are Open and Agreeable Judges More Accurate in Detecting Lies?
I also predicted that perceivers who were high in openness and agreeableness,
respectively would be more accurate in detecting lies. To test this hypothesis, I created a
composite score for the personality traits of openness and agreeableness for each perceiver. I ran
a linear regression, first with the openness composite as the independent variable and lying
accuracy as the dependent variable, then with the agreeableness composite as the independent
variable. However, being high in openness and agreeableness did not relate to higher accuracy in
lie detection (Table 8).
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Table 8 Personality Trait Predictors of Lying Accuracy
Variable
Openness
Constant
Openness
Agreeableness
Constant
Agreeableness
Value Honesty
Constant
Value Honesty
Note. ***p < .01

B

SE

t

7.17***
0.10

0.75
0.14

9.57
0.74

8.40***
-0.12

0.87
0.15

9.67
-0.79

7.45***
0.05

1.54
0.27

4.82
0.19

Are Those That Value Honesty More Accurate in Detecting Lies?
I hypothesized that those that value honesty would more accurately detect lies, as honesty
is more important to them in their daily life. To assess this, I created a composite score for each
perceiver on valuing honesty and inputted that as the independent variable in a linear regression,
with lying accuracy as the dependent variable. Results indicated that valuing honesty did not
predict lying accuracy (Table 8). However, given the low reliability estimate in my sample this is
underestimating the true effect.

Are Those Who Are Confident More or Less Accurate in Detecting Lies?
Next, I hypothesized that confidence in lie judgments would be associated with the
accuracy of lie judgments. To assess this, I related perceivers’ lying accuracy to their confidence
in their judgments of honesty or lying. Overall, those that were more accurate in judging lies
were not significantly more confident in their ratings (Table 9).
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Table 9 Relating Lying Accuracy to Confidence and Trust for Good Judges
Predictors
Lying Accuracy
Distinctive Good Judge
Moderation
Distinctive Good Judge x Lying
Accuracy
Dropping the moderation
Distinctive Good Judge
Normative Good Judge
Moderation
Normative Good Judge x Lying
Accuracy
Dropping the moderation
Normative Good Judge only
Note. ***p < .01

Confidence B (SE)
0.16 (0.10)

Trust B (SE)
0.34 (0.43)

0.79 (0.47)

0.68 (0.45)

2.58 (0.65)***

1.09 (0.71)

0.18 (0.11)

0.14 (0.10)

0.39 (0.15)***

0.35 (0.16)***

I also predicted that good judges that were confident in their lie judgments would be
more accurate because they would not focus on irrelevant cues. To assess this, I first related
perceivers’ lying accuracy to their confidence in their judgments of honesty or lying and
included the distinctive good judge assessment as a moderator in the equation. Distinctive good
judges were more confident in their judgments, but that confidence was not related to higher
levels of lie detection accuracy (Table 9). This means that the relationship between lying
accuracy and confidence in truth and lie judgments is not stronger for distinctive good judges.
Due to the interactions between the distinctive good judge assessment and lying accuracy being
non-significant, I dropped the interaction to trim the model for parsimony (Table 9).
Next, I added the assessment of the normative good judge as a moderator to the equation
of accuracy and confidence. The normative good judge assessment did not moderate the
relationship between lying accuracy and confidence (Table 9), meaning that the relationship
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between lying accuracy and confidence was not stronger for normative good judges. I then
dropped the non-significant interaction for parsimony and found that normative good judges
were, on average, more confident (Table 9).

Perception of Target and Lying Accuracy
Are Those Who Are Perceived as Trustworthy Viewed as Honest?
I next hypothesized that when perceivers viewed a target as credible or trustworthy they
would be more likely to rate that target as being honest. To test this, I related perceivers’ lying
accuracy to their ratings of trusting the targets. Perceivers who accurately judged true statements
and lies did not trust the target more (Table 9). I then tested whether this effect was stronger for
distinctive good judges by including the assessment of the distinctive good judge as a moderator
to the lie accuracy and trusting the target equation. Being a distinctive good judge did not
moderate the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target (Table 9), meaning that
the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target was not stronger for a good
distinctive judge. I then dropped the nonsignificant interaction for parsimony and found that
distinctive good judges, on average, did not trust the targets more (Table 9).
Next, I added the assessment of the normative good judge as a moderator to the lying
accuracy and trusting the target equation. The normative good judge assessment did not
moderate the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target (Table 9), meaning that
this relationship was not stronger for normative good judges. I dropped the nonsignificant
interaction for parsimony and found that normative good judges, on average, tended to trust
targets more (Table 9).
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Previous research has indicated that people are generally accurate in judging the
personality of others (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & Human, 2010; Funder, 1995), but there have
been mixed results about the existence of the good judge (Davis & Kraus, 1997) and the
importance of the good judge in the accuracy of personality impressions (Haselton & Funder,
2006). However, recent studies have highlighted the importance of the good target (Human &
Biesanz, 2013) and have used new methodological techniques to examine the importance of the
good target in examining the good judge (Rogers & Biesanz, in press), which I replicated in my
study. Using these techniques, my results provide further evidence for the existence and
importance of the good judge of personality. As expected, perceivers did vary in their ability to
accurately judge the personality of targets. Using good targets in my main study creates more
variability in the estimates of the good judge, which increases the ability to find effects for the
good judge. The goal of this project was to assess what other skills are related to accurately
judging personality, specifically the ability to accurately judge lies.
Past research in detecting deception has found that, on average, people are inaccurate in
their judgments of lying, with lie accuracy often being no better than chance (Bond & DePaulo,
2008; DePaulo et al., 1997). There are some predictors of being able to accurately judge lying,
such as focusing on relevant cues of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010), being
trained in relevant cues of deception (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010), and the
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ability to identify micro-expressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997), however they are often unreliable
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij & Semin, 1996). The goal of this project was to assess whether being
a good judge of personality was related to accurately judging lies. My results indicated that good
distinctive and normative judges did not more accurately detect lies, however the accuracy of lie
judgments was significantly greater than chance. These accuracy levels are consistent with those
found in the original study using these stimuli, with perceivers rating lies at greater than chance
levels (Hatz, 2007) and more accurate than what has been found in previous research in lie
detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). It is possible that these video stimuli made relevant
deception cues available to perceivers, allowing them to form more accurate judgments of lying.
The lying scenario used in (Hatz, 2007) involved real transgressions, meaning that the targets
who are lying about cheating did cheat. When compared to scenarios that instruct participants to
lie when no cheating occurred, real transgression scenarios produced more deceptive cues (Hatz,
2007). This could indicate that using real transgression lying scenarios could lead to more
accurate judgments of lying or honesty. Being a good judge, the personality traits of openness
and agreeableness, and perceptions of targets did not appear to be related to higher levels of
accuracy, so more research needs to be done to assess why these perceivers formed accurate
impressions of lying and honesty on average.
These findings provide insight into personality and deception research, further informing
both fields about the skills associated with forming accurate impressions. The results of this
study also supported the conclusion of Schlegel et al. (2017), that the ability to accurately judge
personality is not related to accurately judging lies, even when directly assessing personality and
lying impressions instead of using a meta-analytic technique. This meta-analysis also excluded
studies that scored personality accuracy based on target criteria, such as self and informant
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reports, instead they focused on standardized assessments. Therefore, my results provide
evidence that personality and lying impressions are likely not related when assessing personality
accuracy using non-standardized assessments, specifically comparing self- and informantreports to perceivers’ impressions.

Interpretation of Results
Even though my hypotheses were not supported, these null results provide information
about the good judge of personality and the skills required to detect deception. These results
indicate that the skills associated with accurately judging personality are not related to the skills
required to detect lies.

Good Judge of Personality
The first important application of these results is that it further informs the field about the
skills of the good judge of personality. First, this study provided further evidence of the existence
of the good judge because perceivers varied in their ability to accurately judge personality.
Earlier research found no effect of the good judge (Allik et al., 2016) or concluded that the good
judge was not of significant consequence to accurately forming impressions (Haselton & Funder,
2006). However, recent research has highlighted the importance of the target when forming
impressions (Human & Biesanz, 2013; Human et al., 2012). Indeed, the effect of the good judge
is more pronounced when good judges rated good targets (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). I used
this information to design my methodology for my main study because this study indicated that
using good targets increases the variance of good judges, making it easier to differentiate
between good judges. That is, if the targets provide little information about their personality, it is
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harder to distinguish between good judges, but good targets who provide a lot of information
make it easier to distinguish between good judges of personality.
While good judges are skilled at forming accurate personality impressions, there is
limited research assessing their skills at forming other impressions such as lying. This study
further informs research on the good judge by showing that they are not skilled at forming
impressions of lying. One potential reason for this is that the ability to detect and utilize social
cues does not translate to detecting and utilizing lying cues. Forming personality impressions is
also a broader skill, as perceivers are judging multiple traits that individuals can be low or high
in. On the other hand, accurately detecting lies is a specific impression of either truth or lie.

Accurately Detecting Deception
The next important application of these results is that they further inform research on the
skills required to detect deception. There are few reliable individual differences that contribute to
accurately judging lies, and the results of this study indicate that being a good judge is not an
individual difference in the ability to accurately judge lies. This is likely because detecting social
cues may require different skills than those required to detect lying cues. One of the most reliable
individual differences in the ability to detect lies is training (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et
al., 2010), so it is possible that some training concerning which cues to focus on is required for
accuracy to be significantly higher than chance levels. Since my participants were not trained in
what cues indicate lying, this could have made detecting lies too difficult of a task.
Another possible influence is that detecting emotional cues, such as microexpressions in
high stakes lies, is a crucial skill in detecting deception (Frank & Ekman, 1997). Research has
shown that accurately judging personality is related to accurately judging affect (Hall et al.,
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2016), however research has not assessed whether good judges are better at detecting emotional
cues, such as microexpressions. It is possible that good judges are not skilled in detecting
microexpressions, which is one of the few reliable cues to deception (Frank & Ekman, 1997;
Yan et al., 2014). If good judges are not skilled in detecting microexpressions, this could
decrease their ability to judge high stakes lies, so it is important to examine the individual
differences in the good judge’s ability to detect microexpressions.

Limitations
There are some limitations in this study that may have influenced the results. First, using
video targets does provide a different estimate of the ability of the good judge to form accurate
impressions than in person interactions. Some research has indicated that good judges are able to
make targets comfortable in their interactions resulting in the targets eliciting more cues to their
personality (Letzring, 2008). Accurate judgments are formed using video targets (Rogers &
Biesanz, in press) and were formed in the current study, showing that the ability of the good
judge to accurately judge personality relates more to their ability to detect and utilize cues
instead of their ability to elicit relevant cues from the target. While the good judge’s ability is not
limited to eliciting more cues during interactions, using video targets does alter the estimates of
the good judge. As the current study did not assess the effect of the good judge using in person
interactions, we cannot conclusively state that the good judge of personality is not more accurate
in judging lies.
The sample in the current study also included a large number of participants that
completed the study in psychology courses. Due to the large size of the groups that they
participated in, it is possible that participants were distracted and influenced by the reactions of
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those around them. The total number of accurate truth and lie judgments of the participants that
completed the study through SONA was significantly higher than the lying accuracy of those that
completed the study in the psychology and law course, indicating that there were lower levels of
lie detection accuracy for one larger group of participants. This was only found for one larger
group, so this is likely not a large limitation in the main study.
This group effect was not replicated in the other large group of participants from the
social psychology course, they had higher levels of accuracy than those that completed the study
in the psychology and law course. There were also some issues with the sound system in the
social psychology course, which one would think would lead to lower levels of lie accuracy.
Their higher levels of lie accuracy could indicate that those participants were more able to detect
lies than others in the sample. This could be due to exposure to research in detecting deception
covered in their social psychology course or because they could have relied more on nonverbal
cues, possibly indicating that nonverbal cues are more reliable indicators of lying. General ability
and reliance on nonverbal cues could have increased this group’s lie accuracy, which would
confound my results.
Finally, the manipulation used in the lie videos may have not been high stakes enough to
create the emotional cues that lead to more accurate impressions of high stakes versus low stakes
lies. High stakes lies are rated more accurately than low stakes lies due to the presence of
microexpressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997), so if the manipulation did not result in expressing
microexpressions the accuracy of judging lies would decrease.
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Future Directions
To build upon this research, future research could use a round robin design to estimate
the individual differences in the accuracy of personality impressions. My study assessed the
accuracy of the good judge using video targets, which provides a different estimate of the good
judge than in person interactions. This is due to the good judge’s ability to make targets
comfortable in their interactions resulting in the targets eliciting more cues to their personality
(Letzring, 2008). Using a round robin design would allow researchers to examine the good
judge’s ability to detect lies using good judge assessments obtained from in person interactions.
It would also be interesting to have participants complete a task that assesses their ability
to detect microexpressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997). This would allow us to assess the individual
differences in the accuracy of judging microexpressions and determine whether being a good
judge relates to that ability. Finally, it may be possible to explore a lens model (Gosling, Ko,
Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002; Hartwig & Bond, 2011) in which the accuracy of individuals’
impressions are related to the relevant cues provided. Lens models state that environmental cues
provide a lens through which perceivers can form impressions about a construct (Gosling et al.,
2002), such as personality or lying. If a cue relates to a perceiver’s judgment of the construct and
the target’s actual level of that construct, then the perceiver will form an accurate impression
(Gosling et al., 2002), indicating that the cue was relevant. For example, a lens model of lie
accuracy would relate the given deception cues to a perceiver’s judgment of a target’s honesty or
dishonesty and the target’s actual honesty or dishonesty. This model and behavioral coding could
highlight relevant cues of deception as well as the differences in relevant verbal and nonverbal
deception cues. This could demonstrate whether relying on verbal or nonverbal cues lead to more
accurate judgments of deception.
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Conclusion
Even though my hypotheses were not supported these results provide research with a
better understanding of good judges of personality and the individual differences that are not
related to lie detection accuracy. This research provides evidence that the good judge exists and
more accurately judges personality, indicating that without assessing the good target studies are
missing a crucial component in determining the accuracy of forming impressions and the effect
of the good judge. However, good judges do not more accurately detect lies, indicating that their
skills in observing social cues are not related to the ability to observe lying cues. These results
indicate the importance of understanding the processes involved in forming different types of
impressions and start to determine which types of impressions are related to one another.
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APPENDIX A

PERSONALITY SELF-REPORT
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Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next to each
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree a
little

Agree

Agree
strongly

strongly

a little

I See Myself as Someone Who . . .
1. Is bashful
2. Is bold
3. Is careless
4. Is cold
5. Is complex
6. Is cooperative
7. Is creative
8. Is deep
9. Is disorganized
10. Is efficient
11. Is energetic
12. Is envious
13. Is extraverted
14. Is fretful
15. Is harsh
16. Is imaginative
17. Is inefficient
18. Is intellectual
19. Is jealous
20. Is kind
21. Is moody
22. Is organized
23. Is philosophical
24. Is practical
25. Is quiet
26. Is relaxed
27. Is rude
28. Is shy
29. Is sloppy
30. Is sympathetic
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31. Is systematic
32. Is talkative
33. Is temperamental
34. Is touchy
35. Is uncreative
36. In unenvious
37. Is unintellectual
38. Is unsympathetic
39. Is warn
40. Is withdrawn
41. Is authentic
42. Is phony
43. Is superficial
44. Is humble
45. Is entitled
46. Is honest
47. Is down to earth
48. Is materialistic
49. Is bright
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APPENDIX B
PERSONALITY IMPRESSIONS
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Please write the number that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that
statement:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Agree a
little

Agree

Agree
strongly

strongly

a little

I see this person as someone who…
1. Is bashful
2. Is bold
3. Is careless
4. Is cold
5. Is complex
6. Is cooperative
7. Is creative
8. Is deep
9. Is disorganized
10. Is efficient
11. Is energetic
12. Is envious
13. Is extraverted
14. Is fretful
15. Is harsh
16. Is imaginative
17. Is inefficient
18. Is intellectual
19. Is jealous
20. Is kind
21. Is moody
22. Is organized
23. Is philosophical
24. Is practical
25. Is quiet
26. Is relaxed
27. Is rude
28. Is shy
29. Is sloppy
30. Is sympathetic
31. Is systematic
32. Is talkative
62

33. Is temperamental
34. Is touchy
35. Is uncreative
36. In unenvious
37. Is unintellectual
38. Is unsympathetic
39. Is warn
40. Is withdrawn
41. Is authentic
42. Is phony
43. Is superficial
44. Is humble
45. Is entitled
46. Is honest
47. Is down to earth
48. Is materialistic
49. Is bright
50. Is mature
51. Is reasonable
52. Is hypocritical
53. Is inconsiderate
54. Has high status
55. Is a leader
56. Is respected and admired by others
57. Is very likable
58. Is physically attractive
59. Is engaging and interesting
60. Is from the same cultural or ethnic group as me
61. Has a similar accent or way of speaking as me
62. Is aggressive and unrestrained
63. Is bashful and unassuming
64. Is opportunistic and crafty
65. Is sarcastic and demanding

1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Not At
All

Neutral

A Great
Deal

66. How much do you like this person overall?
67. How much do you trust this person?
68. How well do you think your impression would agree with someone who knows this
person very well?
69. How well do you think this person’s impression of you would agree with how you and
your close friends view your personality?
70. What are the individual’s political beliefs? Use scale below.
1

2

3

Conservative

4

5

6

7

Neutral

Liberal

71. Please circle the picture or letter below which best depicts you in relation to the person in
the video.

______________________________________________________________________________
79. Have you met this person before?

Yes

No

80. If yes, how do you know him/her? ______________________________
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APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHICS
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1. What is your age (in years)? _______________
2. What is your gender?
A. Male
B. Female
C. Other
D. Prefer not to answer
3. What is your ethnicity?_______________________
4. What is your major?__________________
5. What is your class rank?
A. Freshman
B. Sophomore
C. Junior
D. Senior
E. Other
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APPENDIX D
VALUING HONESTY SELF-REPORT
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Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next to each
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree a
little

Agree

Agree
strongly

strongly

a little

I…
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Am trusted to keep secrets.
Keep my promises.
Believe that honesty is the basis for trust.
Can be trusted to keep my promises.
Am true to my own values.
Lie to get myself out of trouble.
Am hard to understand.
Feel like an imposter.
Like to exaggerate my troubles.
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APPENDIX E
TRUTH OR LIE IMPRESSIONS
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Please indicate whether this person was telling the truth or lying:
1

2

Truth

Lie

Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree
with that statement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree a
little

Agree

Agree
strongly

strongly

a little

1. I am confident in my impression of this person’s honesty.
2. I trust this person.
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